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WYOMING FARM B UREAu FEDERA TION V. BABBIT:
THE CHILDREN OF THE NIGHT RETURN To THE
NORTHERN ROCKY MOUNTAINS
EDWARD A. FITZGERALD*
The reintroduction of the gray wolf into the northern Rocky
Mountains was very controversial. Environmental groups asserted
that the wolves were the missing link in the ecosystem and necessary
to ensure ecological balance.' Environmentalists argued that the
wolves would have no significant impact on livestock or big game,
whereas the state and local governments opposed wolf reintroduction,
which was viewed as an intrusion on their traditional management
prerogatives, therefore, the government's priorities were the
protection of other vital economic interests.2 The livestock industry
worried that the wolves would prey on cattle and sheep and no
compensation would be forthcoming. 3 Hunting groups feared that the
wolves would endanger big game herds and harm hunting.
Developers were concerned that their activities would be limited in
the wolves territory. All of these concerns were subsumed within the
larger symbolic battle over public lands management in the west.
State and local governments and economic interests were worried that
economic development, which characterizes federal natural resource
management, were giving way to an ecological and environmental
ethic.4
Professor, Department of Political Science, Wright State University, P.h.d. Political
Science, Boston University, 1983; M.A. Political Science, Northeastern University, 1976; J.D.
Boston College Law School, 1974; B.A. Political Science, Holy Cross College, 1971.
'Brian N. Beisher, Comments, Are Ranchers Legitimately Trying to Save Their
Hides or Are They Just Crying Wolf-What Issues Must Be Resolved Before WolfReintroduction
to Yellowstone National Park Proceeds?, 29 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 417, 430-42 (1994);
Robert B. Keiter and Patrick T. Holshea, WolfRecover, Under the Endangered Species Act: A
Study in Contemporary Federalism, II PUB. LAND L. REV. 19, 30-35 (1990); Robert C. Moore,
The Pack is Back: The Political, Social, and Ecological Effects of the Reintroduction of the
Gray Wolf to Yellowstone National Park and Central Idaho, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 647
(1995).
'Id.
3One commentator noted that "ranchers, loggers and others who work the land,"
view the wolves as "nature's equivalent of urban street gangs--relentless killing machines that
threaten their livelihoods." John Gibeaut, WolfReintroduction, A.B.A. J. 55, 56 (July 1999).
4Brian N. Beisher, Comments, Are Ranchers Legitimately Trying to Save Their
Hides or Are The), Just Crying Wolf-What Issues Must Be Resolved Before Wolf Reintroduction
to Yellowstone National Park Proceeds?, 29 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 417, 430-42 (1994);
Robert B. Keiter and Patrick T. Holshea, Wolf Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act: A
Study in Contemporary Federalism, I I PUB. LAND L. REV. 19,30-35 (1990); Robert C. Moore,
The Pack is Back: The Political Social, and Ecological Effects of the Reintroduction of the
Gray Wolf to Yellowstone National Park and Central Idaho, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 647
(1995).
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This article examines the controversy regarding the
reintroduction of the wolves into the northern Rockies. The
mandates of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)5 and the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),6 which are the principal statutes
involved in the issue, are set forth. A history of the wolves and the
litigation regarding their reintroduction is presented. Statutory
interpretation and the judicial review of administrative decisions are
reviewed. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Wyoming
Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt7 is analyzed. The 10th Circuit's
decision upholding the reintroduction of the gray wolves was
consistent with the text, intent, and purposes of the ESA and the
NEPA. Finally, this article discusses the impact of wolf
reintroduction.
I. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) AND NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA)
The reintroduction of the gray wolf into the northern Rockies
occurred pursuant to section 10(j) of the ESA.8 When the Secretary
of the Interior (Secretary), specifically the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) or National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
decides to establish an experimental population, the FWS issues an
environmental assessment pursuant to the NEPA to determine
whether the federal action will have a significant impact on the
environment.9 The FWS generally finds that reintroduction does not
have a significant impact on the environment, so an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) is not warranted. 10 This was not the case
regarding the reintroduction of the gray wolf into the northern
Rockies. " The pertinent requirements of the ESA and NEPA follow.
A. The ESA
The ESA was enacted in 1973 to address the extinction of
species. 12  The Act acknowledges that endangered and threatened
species provide "aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
5Endangered Species Act 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1534 (1994).
6National Environmental Policy Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994),
'Wyoming Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F.Supp. 1349 (D.Wyo. 1997);
Wyoming Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000).
'16 U.S.C. § 1539(). This section of the ESA is referred to among scholars as §
10(j) and is done so throughout the body of this work.
9
Mimi S. Wolok, Experimenting with Experimental Populations, 26 ENVTL. L.





See generally, MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 193-212 (3d ed. 1997).
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recreational and scientific value to the Nation."' 3 The ESA provides
"for the conservation, protection, restoration and propagation of
species of fish, wildlife, and plants facing extinction."'14  The
Supreme Court described the ESA as "the most comprehensive
legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by
any nation."' 5  The Court declared that "Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest priorities," and "the
plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and
reverse the trend towards species extinction." 16
Section 4 of the ESA authorizes the Secretary to utilize the
best scientific evidence and list domestic or foreign species as
endangered or threatened.' 7 An endangered species is "any species
which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion
of its range."' 8 A threatened species is "any species which is likely to
become an endangered species in the foreseeable future throughout
all or significant portion of its range."' 9
Section 7 requires federal agencies to further "the purposes of
this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of
"endangered and threatened species. 20 Each federal agency must
insure that any action, which it authorizes, funds, or carries out, is not
likely to "jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species."
2'
The federal agency must consult with the FWS to determine if an
endangered or threatened species is present. 22 If one is present, the
agency must perform a biological assessment to determine if the
species will be affected by the proposed action. 3 If the species will
be affected, the agency must consult with the FWS.24  After
consultation, the Secretary issues a biological opinion that addresses
the likely impact on the species and reasonable alternatives to protect
the species. 25 If the species is jeopardized, the project cannot go
forward without an exemption.26
Section 9 prohibits the taking of any endangered or
threatened species by all persons who do not have a permit or
authorization.27 The ESA defines "take" to mean "harass, harm,
" 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3).
'4S. REP. No. 93-307, at 1 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990.
1T'ennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
"Ild. at 174, 184.
" 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a).
"I1d. § 1532(6).
"Id. § 1532(20).2"id. § 1532(a).2id. § 1536(a)(2).
2'1d. § 1536(a)(3).
211d. § 1536(c).241d
2 1d. § 1536(b).
261d.
2716 U.S.C § 1538 (1994).
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pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt
to engage in any such conduct. 2 8  Civil and criminal penalties are
29
authorized to enforce this provision.
The ESA was amended and reauthorized in 1978 and 1979.
3°
The Endangered Species Committee was established to provide an
exemption from the stringent requirements of section 7, if the federal
activity is deemed to be in the national interest.
3  The Secretary was
also directed to develop and implement recovery plans, that are
"designed to ensure the conservation or survival of each listed
species.
3 2
The definition of conservation 3 3 in section 3, the section 4
recovery plans, and section 7 mandate that all federal agencies
administer their programs to further the purposes of the Act provided
the Secretary with the authority to translocate and reintroduce
endangered and threatened species back into their historic range.
There was, however, no distinction between the protection afforded
to natural and reintroduced species. This generated political
opposition to reintroduction.
34
In 1982, Congress provided a more efficient means to
advance species recovery and decrease political opposition
35 by
enacting section 10(j) of the ESA,36which grants the Secretary
flexibility to establish and decrease the legal protection afforded to
any reintroduced species. Section 10(j)(1) identifies an experimental
population as "any population (including any offspring arising solely
thereof) authorized by the Secretary for release under paragraph (2),
"Id- § 1532(19).




321d. § 1533(0; H.R. REP. NO, 95-1625, at 19 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, at 9469; H.R. CONG. REP. NO. 995-1804, at 27-28 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 9494-95; See also, BEAN AND ROWLAND, supra note 12, at 210-12.33Conservation means "the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to
bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided
pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary. Such methods and procedures include, but are
not limited to, all activities associated with scientific resources management such as research,
census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and
transplantation, and in the extraordinary case where population pressures within a given
ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking." 16 U.S.C. § 1532.
34Wolok, supra note 9, at 10018-19.
3'The House Committee report noted:
Another shortcoming of the Act is its tendency to discourage voluntary introduction of species
in areas outside their historic range. State fish and wildlife agencies had probed the feasibility
of introducing such 'experimental populations, but they feared political opposition to
reintroducing species unless some assurances were simultaneously extended to prevent the
creation of ESA problems. In order to mitigate fears expressed by industry that such
experimental populations would halt development projects, the Committee defined what an
experimental population is and how it shall be treated under the Act. Clarification of legal
responsibilities incumbent with these populations will, it is hoped, encourage private parties to
host experimental populations on their lands. 97 H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 3233 (1982).
3
16 U.S.C- § 15390).
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but only when, and at such times as, the population is wholly separate
geographically from nonexperimental populations of the same
species.0 7  Section 100)(2) authorizes the Secretary to release "any
population (including eggs, propagules, or individuals) of an
endangered species or threatened species outside of the current range
of such species if the Secretary determines that such release will
further the conservation of such species."38 Before authorizing such a
release, "the Secretary shall by regulation identify the population and
determine, on the basis of the best available information, whether or
not such population is essential to the continued existence of an
endangered species or a threatened species." 39 All members of the
experimental population "shall be treated as a threatened species.,
40
A nonessential population is only managed as a threatened species
"within the National Wildlife Refuge System or the National Park
System.",41 Otherwise it is treated "as a species proposed to be listed."
No critical habitat is designated for any nonessential population.42
B. NEPA
The NEPA establishes a national commitment by the federal
government to protect the environment 43 and backs this commitment
with requirements that force action." When a federal agency
contemplates a major federal action that significantly affects the
environment, the agency must prepare an EIS, which discusses:
1. the environmental impact of the proposed action;
2. any adverse environmental effects which cannot
37
1d.
38The regulations define conservation as I) any possible adverse effects on the extant
population of a species as a result of the removal of individuals, eggs, or propagules for
introduction elsewhere; 2) the likelihood that any such experimental population will become
established and survive in the foreseeable future; 3) the relative effects that establishment of a
population will have on the recovery of the species; and 4) the extent to which the introduced
population may be affected by existing or anticipated federal or state actions or private
activities within or adjacent to the experimental population area. 50 C.F.R. § 17.81(b) (1984);
See also Wolok, supra note 9, at 1002 1.
35The FWS has discretion regarding special rule to develop management guidelines,
specific prohibitions, exceptions for the takings of individual animals. Each rule must specify
the following: how the population will be identified, including its location, migration pattern,
and number to be released; whether the population is essential or nonessential, management
considerations specific to the population (including exceptions to taking prohibitions under the
ESA); and an evaluation scheme to determine the success or failure of the release on the species
conservation. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.82, 17.81 (c); See also, Wolok, supra note 9, at 10021.





*42 U.S.C. § 4321; See Edward A- Fitzgerald, The Rise and Fall of Worst Case
Analysis, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1,4-8 (1992).
4442 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
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be avoided should the proposal be adopted;
3. alternatives to the proposed action;
4. the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity; and
5. any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of
resources which should be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented. a
The EIS insures that the federal decisionmakers have
considered environmental factors in their decisionmaking process.
Furthermore, the EIS informs the public and other political actors
about the potential consequences of the proposed 
federal activity.
4 6
Courts view the NEPA as a procedural, rather than a
substantive, statute.4 7 The NEPA is an environmental full disclosure
law, which does not require a federal agency to choose the most
environmentally benign course of action.4 8 A federal agency's NEPA
compliance is reviewed pursuant to the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA) to determine if the agency's action is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not according to the
law" or "without observance of the procedure required by law.
49
The United States Supreme Court explained that:
To make this finding the court must consider whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the
facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate
standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not




The Court noted that an agency's decision is entitled to a
"presumption of regularity," but that presumption will not shield [the
agency's] action from a through, probing, in-depth review."'"
45
1d.
'6Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).4
1Strykee's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 203, 227-28 (1980);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U.S. 390,410 n.21 (1976)
"Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S- 332, 350 (1989).49
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D).
5 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
" id., at 41S.
[VOL. 16:1
2001-02] WYOMING FARM BUREAU FEDERATION V. BABBITT 85
II. WOLF REINTRODUCTION
Government policy regarding wolves has changed throughout
American history.52 After the destruction of the buffalo in the middle
of the nineteenth century, the fur trade focused on the wolves, which
were hunted for their pelts.53 With the elimination of the buffalo,
farming and ranching expanded in the west.54  These growing
economic enterprises sought to eradicate the wolves, which were seen
as threat to life and livestock. 55 Between 1870 and 1877, the federal
government employed bounty hunters who killed 385,000 wolves.
56
In 1907, the U.S. Biological Survey, the predecessor to the FWS,
declared that the extermination of the wolves, which President
Theodore Roosevelt characterized as "beasts of waste and
destruction," was "a paramount objective of the government. 5 7 In
1914, Congress, at the request of the livestock industry, specifically
instructed the Biological Survey to "destroy wolves, prairie dogs, and
other animals injurious to agriculture and animal husbandry." 58 The
federal government's efforts were supplemented by state government
actions.59 By 1926, the gray wolves were eliminated from the Great
Plains. The last wolves were killed in Washington in 1940 and in
Colorado and Wyoming in 1943.60 Extermination efforts were so
successful that the gray wolves were reduced to less than one per cent
of their original population and eliminated from ninety-five percent
of their original habitat in the lower forty-eight states by the middle
of the twentieth century.
6 1
5
Scott R. Cleere, Wolf Reintroduction as an Experimental Population under the
Endangered Species Act: Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 83,
85-88 (1999); Timothy B. Strauch, Holding the Wolf By the Ears: The Conservation of the
Northern Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf in Yellowstone National Park, 27 LAND & WATER L.




1d.tSrtrauch, supra note 52, at 38-39.
5 t
Elizabeth Cowan Brown, The Wholly Separate Truth: Did the Yellowstone
Reintroduction Violate Section 106) of the Endangered Species Act?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 425,426-27 (2000).
5
"Christopher J. Kirwan, Wolves and Recovery Plans: The Difficult Road to Wolf
Preservation in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, 60UMKC L. REV. 517, 519-23 (1992);
Jennifer Li, The Wolves May Have Won the Battle, But Not the War: How the West Was Won
Under the Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan, 30 ENVTL. L. 677, 683-85 (2000).
591n 1883, Montana enacted the first bounty on wolves at SI/pelt. From 1883 to
1918, 80,730 wolves were killed in Montana. In the early 1900's, Idaho passed a predator
control act. From 1919-1928,258 wolves were killed in Idaho. Strauch,supra note 52, at 40-41.
60lnga Haagenson Causey, The Reintroduction of the Wolf in Yellowstone: Has the
Program Fatally Wounded the Very Species It Sought to Protect?, II TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 461,
462 (1998).
6iCleere, supra note 52, at 85-88; David R. Dinger, Throwing Canis Lupus to the
Wolves: United States v. McKittrick and the Existence of the Yellowstone and Central Idaho
Experimental WolfPopulations Under a Flawed Provision ofthe Endangered Species Act, 2000
B.Y.U. L. REV. 377, 383-86.
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In 1872, the federal government created Yellowstone
National Park "as a public park or pleasure ground for the benefit and
enjoyment of the people., 62  The Secretary of the Interior was
authorized to "provide against the wanton destruction of the fish and
game found within the park,, 63 but wolves were still hunted. In 1916,
the National Park Service (NPS) was established and authorized to
conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wildlife of the
parks for the enjoyment of future generations. 64 The NPS viewed its
mission exclusively as protecting big game for hunting. The NPS
joined with the U.S. Biological Survey to kill 136 wolves, including
eighty pups, and virtually eliminated the wolves from Yellowstone by
1926.65
With the emergence of the environmental movement in the
1960s and 1970S, 66 government policy towards the wolves changed.
The wolves became viewed as important and vital components of the
ecosystem and the government sought to protect and restore the wolf
population. 67 In 1967, the timber wolf was listed as endangered
subspecies. 68 In 1973, the northern rocky mountain wolf was listed
as an endangered subspecies. 69 In 1978, the gray wolf population in
the U.S. was listed as endangered, except in Minnesota where it was
only a threatened species.70  The first recovery plan, which was
developed in 1977, did not recommend the reintroduction of the
wolves into Yellowstone. 71 In 1980, the FWS developed a recovery
plan that recommended natural recovery and reintroduction of wolves
around Yellowstone Park and north to the Canadian border, including
central Idaho.72
Historically the gray wolf had been found in the northern
Rocky Mountain states, including Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho.
73
No breeding wolf pacts had been reported in the northern Rockies,
but there were sightings of individual dispersing wolves from the
Canadian packs.74 In 1985, a pack of twelve, known as the Magic




'Strauch, supra note 5;, at 42-44; Kirwan, supra note 58, at 521-23.
66See generally James Bowman, The Environmental Movement: An Assessment of
Ecology Politics, 5 ENVTL AFF. 649 (1976).67
David Todd, Wof-Predator Control and Endangered Species Protection:
Thoughts on Politics and Law, 33 S. TEx. L. REV. 459 (1992).
6"NATIVE FISH AND WILDLIFE, 32 FED. REG. NO. 48,4001 (March 11, 1967).
69CONSERVATION OF ENDANGERED SPECIES AND OTHER FISH OR WILDLIFE, 38
FED. REG. No. 106, 14,678 (June 4, 1973).
7"43 FED. REG. No. 47,9612 (Mar. 9, 1978).
71MAUREEN GREELEY, WOLF 119 (1996).
721d
73
1d.; See also, Dale D. Goebel, Of Wolves and Welfare Ranching, 16 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV 101, 126-27 (1992).
741d.
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Pack, migrated from Canada into Glacier National Park. In 1986, the
five pups were born, the first in the park and the first in the west in
many decades.
75
The 1980 plan was revised in 1987 and called for the
reintroduction of ten breeding pairs for three consecutive years in
three recovery areas.76 The plan forecast natural recovery in Montana
and Idaho, and if natural recovery did not occur in central Idaho, an
experimental population would be introduced. 77  A nonessential
experimental population would be introduced into Yellowstone,
which would decrease local opposition.78  Three zones were
established in each area and the wolves would receive less protection
once they moved outside the central zone.
79
Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming allied with the livestock
industry, hunters, outfitters, and land developers to oppose the
reintroduction plan.80 Idaho enacted a law that precluded the State
Department of Fish and Game from cooperating with federal wolf
reintroduction. 8' Montana wanted the wolf delisted and managed
under the state's Nongame and Endangered Species Act.82 Wyoming
opposed wolf reintroduction and continued to list the wolf as a
83predator. Several U.S. Senators from these states voiced their
opposition. Senator Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.) claimed that "wolves
eat people."84 Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) predicted "a dead
child within a year" of wolf reintroduction.
85
The reintroduction plan caused interagency conflict in the
Reagan administration. The NPS supported reintroduction.
However, Montana representative Ron Marlenee wrote to the NPS
and declared, "Montana needs wolves like we need another
drought."86 Wyoming representative Dick Cheney wrote to the NPS
and stated, "I don't know how to make myself any clearer on wolf
recovery. I am strongly opposed to it. I would like to see some
evidence that officials in your department get the message."8 7 The
FWS did not endorse reintroduction. Frank Dunkle, the FWS
director, stated that "he would not allow the FWS to fund any wolf
75
1d.















87/d. at 529; Strauch, supra note 52, at 57-63.
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recovery work. The wolf stops at my desk."88  The Reagan
administration backed off reintroduction, and Secretary of the Interior
Donald Hodel decided to delay any implementation of the plan until
additional studies were completed.8 9
In 1988, the House of Representatives Appropriations
Committee approved funds for an EIS, but the funds were deleted in
conference. 90 Instead, $200,000 was appropriated for studies on the
wolves' impact on wildlife.91 The conference committee noted that
"the return of the wolf to Yellowstone is desirable."
92
After the Bush administration announced a delay in wolf
reintroduction, action commenced in Congress. Representative
Wayne Owens (D-Utah) introduced legislation that would compel the
Secretary to conduct an EIS on the 1987 plan by December 31, 1991
and implement its recommendations. 93  The EIS would address
migration, state wildlife management, and an experimental
population designation. The NPS and conservation groups opposed
the legislation, asserting that it did not comply with the ESA
requirements. Hearings were held, but the bill was rejected.94
Senator James McClure (R-Ida.) proposed a compromise bill
in 1989, which called for the introduction of three mating pairs into
the Yellowstone and central Idaho reintroduction areas. 95 Wolves
leaving the reintroduction areas would be subject to state control.
However, Senator McClure's bill failed. 96  Despite the efforts of
Representative Owens and Senator McClure, EISs for wolf
reintroduction were not authorized in 1989. Congress did, however,
appropriate $175,000 for reintroduction studies in 1990. 9'
In 1990, the Secretary of the Interior issued a final report on
the studies that were authorized in 1988. He decided to proceed with
wolf reintroduction as experimental populations that had been
proposed in the 1987 recovery plan.98 After the report was released,
Senator McClure reintroduced a bill that addressed state and local
concerns regarding the 1987 plan. 99 The bill authorized the release of
8 Harry R. Bader, Wolf Conservation: The Importance of Following Endangered
Species Recovery Plans, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 517, 518 (1989).
"
0See, Strauch, supra note 52, at 58-59.






H.R. REP. NO. 101-2786 (1989). Representative Owens had introduced another bill
that required the NPS to restore the wolf to Yellowstone within three years, but the bill was
defeated. H.R. REP. No. 100-3387 (1987); See also, Strauch, supra note 52, at 60-61.
'See, Strauch, supra note 52, at 61.
951d.96id
"
97Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701 (1989).
"Strauch, supra note 52, at 61-62.
9S. 2674, 101 st Cong. (2d Sess 1990).
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three breeding pairs into the core zones of Yellowstone and central
Idaho, where these wolves would be treated as endangered.' 00 The
state governments would manage any wolves found outside the
zones. Wolves would be delisted and lose their endangered species
designation. I 1' The FWS, NPS, and environmental groups opposed
the bill because they wanted the wolves to be reintroduced as an
experimental population.102  Congress did not enact Senator
McClure's bill.10 3
The House Appropriations Committee earmarked funds for
an EIS regarding reintroduction.' 0 4  The conference committee
deleted the provision, but directed the Secretary to appoint a ten-
member Wolf Management Committee'0 5 to develop gray wolf
reintroduction and management plans for Yellowstone and central
Idaho and issue its report by May 15, 1991.106 The conference
committee authorized $375,000 for the study. 17
In 1991, the Wolf Management Committee issued a report,
which made the following recommendations.'08  First, Congress
should designate Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming as nonessential
experimental area for the purpose of wolf recovery until July 1,
1993.109 The FWS would manage wolves in experimental population
areas according to the plan until the EIS, rulemaking, and state
management plans were completed. 110 Second, Congress should
declare that primary management authority for wolves outside
Glacier Area, National Parks, and National Wildlife Refuges would
be under state jurisdiction."' To assume jurisdiction, the states
would have to adopt wolf management plans that were agreed to by
the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture and their governors prior to
any release in Yellowstone, but no later than July 1, 1993.112 Third,
Congress should declare as the basic components of any state wolf




'°3Strauch, supra note 52, at 62; Patrick Impero Wilson, Wolves, Politics, and the
Nez Perce: Wolf Recovery in Central Idaho and the Role qf Native Tribes, 39 NAT.
RESOURCES. J. 543,545-49 (1999).
""H.R. REP. NO. 101-789, at 1819 (1990). See also, Strauch, supra note 52, at 62.
1°5The Wolf Committee was comprised of members from the FWS, National Forest
Service, National Park Service, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming Fish and Game Services, Gem
State Hunter's Association, National Wildlife Federation, Defenders of Wildlife, and American
Sheep Industry Association.




"°WOLF MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, WOLVES IN YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK
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unacceptable impacts on livestock, big game resources, multiple land
uses; and, b) the responsibility to pursue wolf recovery.13
The Wolf Management Committee report was "dead on
arrival in Congress." Wolf advocates opposed the plan because the
designated experimental area, the Yellowstone Ecosystem, included
the naturally repopulating wolves in northwestern Montana, which
were protected as an endangered species. Wolf advocates were also
wary of state management.14
In August 1991, the Defenders of the Wildlife filed suit to
force the Secretary to implement the 1987 plan. This elicited a
congressional response," 5  when the House Appropriations
Committee recommended that the Secretary proceed to conduct a
draft EIS on the 1987 plan." 6 The Senate Appropriations Committee,
which was under pressure from the Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho
senators, deleted the funds for any wolf reintroduction, but instructed
the Secretary to perform an EIS regarding wolf reintroduction.,
7
The conference committee appropriated the funds to perform an EIS,
but no funds could be utilized to reintroduce any wolves."
8 Congress
directed the FWS in consultation with the NPS and National Forest
Service (NFS) to prepare EIS regarding reintroduction of the wolves
into Yellowstone and central Idaho by January 1994.19
The FWS formed an interagency team, which was comprised
of representatives from the NPS, NFS, Wyoming, Montana, and
Idaho, Department of Agriculture Animal Damage Control, and Wind
River and Nez Perce Tribes to prepare the EIS. The Final EIS
(FEIS), which was released in May 1994, considered five
alternatives: 1) reintroduction as an experimental population; 2)
natural recovery (no action), 3) a no wolf alternative, 4) the Wolf
Management Committee proposal, and 5) reintroduction of
nonexperimental wolves with full ESA protection. The FEIS
recommended the reintroduction of the gray wolves into the park as a
nonessential experimental population.' 
20
The FWS chose to reintroduce the wolves into Yellowstone
because the park contains high quality wolf habitat and good release
sites and is far from the natural southern expansion of the Montana
131d.
1lBeisher, supra note I, at 429; Keiter and Holshea, supra note 1, at 5 1.
115Kirwin, supra note 58, at 534.
1"
6
H.R. REP. No. 102-116, at 21 (1991).
" S REP. No. 102-122, at 23, 25 (1991).
"'H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-256, at 16-17 (1991); See also Strauch, supra note 52,
at 67.
"' 13 7 CONG. REC. H 8075 (October 17, 1991).
"'Causey, supra note 60, at 463-64; John Andrew Zuccotti, A Native Returns: The
Endangered Species Act and Wolf Reintroduction to the Northern Rocky Mountains, 20
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 329, 347-54 (1995).
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wolf packs.121 Gray wolves would also be reintroduced into central
Idaho under a special rule.' 22  The FWS determined that the
reintroduced wolves would have a high probability to succeed
because of favorable ecological and political considerations.
123
Genetic diversity would be increased through the genetic interchange
between segments of the population, which would help to achieve
wolf recovery goals twenty years sooner. 124 The Yellowstone and
central Idaho reintroductions, along with the natural regeneration in
Montana, would produce a viable wolf population by 2002.125 The
classification of the experimental populations as nonessential would
reduce local concerns about regulation of private lands, livestock
depredation, big game predation, and the lack of state involvement.'
26
The FWS decided to obtain forty-five to seventy-five wolves
from southwest Canada and transfer them to Yellowstone and central
Idaho. Fifteen wolves would be reintroduced annually for three to
five years into Yellowstone and central Idaho, fitted with collars, and
monitored. The goal was to establish populations of three hundred
wolves, which would allow the species to recover by 2002.127
In November 1994, the Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation
(WYFB) filed suit to enjoin the FWS 2 8 from releasing the wolves,
alleging NEPA, ESA, and APA violations. 129 The National Wildlife
Fund and the Defenders of the Wildlife intervened on behalf of the
FWS. In January 1995, the federal district court denied the injunction
request and the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals did not order a stay.13
0
The first four wolves, which were brought from Canada, were
released into the Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness in
central Idaho on January 14, 1995.3' A week later eleven more
wolves were released in Idaho. Eighteen wolves were released into
Yellowstone in 1995 beginning in March. The wolves generally
stayed within recovery areas. The Yellowstone wolves were
monitored weekly and the central Idaho wolves were monitored






12759 Fed. Reg. 60,252 & 60,253-56 (1994).
"58The WYFB was represented by William Perry Pendley, the president and legal
director of the Mountain States Legal Foundation, a public interest law firm that represents
property owners and local governments on environmental issues. Gibeaut, supra note 3, at 56.
See also, Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Wyo. 1997).
..9GREELEY, supra note 71, at 129.
13OId.
3 Afler the Idaho legislature rejected a wolf management plan developed by the
Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the Nez Perce tribe submitted a wolf management plan
that was accepted by Interior. Wilson, supra note 103, at 549-54.
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biweekly.'
32
After the initial release, Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt
testified that, "Our aim is to is to speed the recolonization of wolves
so that they can be removed from the endangered species list and
federal protection by the year 2002." Secretary Babbitt noted that,
"As wolves that already live in northern Montana continue to expand
their populations and disperse, wolf management will become more
difficult and expensive without the reintroduction program. Because
the delisting of the wolf will take much longer, the long-term cost to
the ranching community and to the Federal government would be
much higher."1
33
III. WYOMING FARM BUREAU FEDERA TION (WYFB) v. BABBITT'
34
The WYFB suit continued, and the National Audubon
Society filed a second complaint, alleging that the demotion of the
naturally occurring wolves in the experimental population area from
endangered to threatened violated the ESA. 3 ' The Urbigkits, a
couple who studied the Yellowstone wolves, filed a third complaint,
asserting that the EIS failed to discuss the impacts of reintroduction
on the naturally occurring subspecies of wolves in Yellowstone, canis
lupus irremotus. 
136
In December 1997, the Federal District Court for the District
of Wyoming held that the reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone
and central Idaho violated section 10(j) of the ESA. 3 7 The court
determined that individual dispersing wolves could enter the
experimental population area.138 The potential overlap of the natural
and experimental populations violated section 10(j) because the
experimental population was not "wholly separate geographically"
and had not been released outside "the current range" of the natural
population. 139 Furthermore, the reduction of the status of individual
dispersers from endangered to threatened in the experimental
population area violated the ESA. 140  The district court found no
'32GREELEY, supra note 71, at 129; Wolok, supra note 9, at 10028.
1
33U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Resources. The Reintroduction of
the Gray Wolf Into Yellowstone National Park and Central Idaho (testimony of Bruce Babbitt,
Secretary of Interior) (Jan. 26, 1995); See also, Moore, supra note 1, at 655, 678.
" 4987 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Wyo. 1997).
'"
51d., at 1357-1358.
" 61d.. at 1356.
1
37
/d., at 1349; Scott Youngblood, Wildlife Restoration Projects: Hope.for Life or a
Death Sentence: A Look at Reintroduction of Wolves to the Northern Rocky Mountains, 40 S_
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violation of the NEPA.141
The 10th Circuit reversed the district court on each of the
three ESA issues. 142 The 10th Circuit accepted the FWS definition of
population and determined that individual dispersing wolves did not
constitute a population. The FWS's determination that the
experimental population was "wholly separate geographically" from
the natural population and released outside "the current range" of the
natural population was upheld. 143 The 10th Circuit found that the
Secretary could treat all wolves found in the experimental population
area as part of the experimental population. 144 This would help to
achieve the recovery goals of the statute and avoid law enforcement
problems. 14' The 10th Circuit concurred with the district court's
determination that the EIS complied with the NEPA. 1
46
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
The reintroduction of the wolves demonstrates the dynamic
relationship between Congress, executive agencies, and the courts.1
4 7
The Legislative Branch enacts laws and the Executive Branch
enforces laws. Under the Office of the President, administrative
agencies are delegated authority to implement the law. When policy
conflicts arise, litigation often ensues. This public law litigation
focuses on the agency's interpretation and implementation of the
statute. 148 The court's role is to interpret the law and review agency
action to ensure adherence to the statutory mandate.'4 9 When
examining the agency's legal interpretation,' 50 the court utilizes the
'ld., at 1366-69.
1
42Wyoming Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000); See
also, Brown, supra note 57.





47Beth M. Henschen and Edward 1. Sidlow, The Supreme Court and the
Congressional-Agenda Setting Process, 10 J.L. & POL. 685 (1989); William N. Eskridge,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L. J. 331 (1991);
James L. Walker and Michael E. Solomine, The Next Word: Congressional Response to
Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 Temple L. Rev. 425 (1992); BRADLEY C. CANON AND
CHARLES JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 122 (2d ed. 1999).
'48Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976).
'9WALTER ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 110 (3d ed.
1995); James Lester and Joseph Stewart, Public Policy: An Evolutionary Approach 100 (1996).
For a full explanation of the role of the courts in the policymaking process, see Edward A.
Fitzgerald, The Seaweed Rebellion: Federal-State Conflicts Over Offshore Energy Development
5-26 (2001).
" 'There are various theories of statutory interpretation, which are the subject of an
ongoing debate regarding democratic legitimacy. Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory
Interpretation, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233 (1997).
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two step conceptual framework provided in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council (Chevron). 151
A. Chevron: Step One
The first step requires the court to determine "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."' 52 The
court must examine the text, intent, and purposes of the statute. This
technique, which is known as originalism, recognizes a statute as the
command of the sovereign that must be interpreted by other agencies
of government. 53  Originalism presumes that the democratically-
elected legislature has the constitutional responsibility for making
policy and the legislative command is supreme. 5 4 The court acts as
the agent of the legislature and determines the legislative mandate. 1
55
The court, which is not accountable to the electorate, has some
discretion, but is constrained to act within the parameters of the
statute to carry out its purposes. 156 Originalism is consistent with the
constitutional principles of popular sovereignty, majoritarianism,
separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism. 
157
1. Text
The court begins by examining the text of the statute, which
has been enacted into law through the constitutionally prescribed
process. 158 Dictionary definitions, grammatical construction, and the
canons of statutory construction are reviewed.'59 The structure of the
statute is analyzed to see how the words are utilized in the statute and
''467 U.S. 837 (1984); Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency
Interpretations ofStatutes?, 1991 WiS. L. REV- 1275, 1278-79; Theodore L. Garrett, Judicial
Review after Chevron: The Courts Reassess Their Role, 10 NAT. RES. AND ENVI. 59 (1995);
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L. J. 969, 972-73




Chevron, 467 U.S., at 842.
'53Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 467 (1989); Martin H. Redish and Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the
Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L.




5 William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 340-341 (1990); Eskridge, supra note 153, at 660-663;
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how the definition fits in with the statute as a whole. 160 The use of
the same words in other statutes and the interaction of the statute with
other laws are also scrutinized. 16 1 Reliance on the text confines the
court's inquiry to manageable proportions, increases the probability
of obtaining judicial agreement, and provides for certainty and
predictability in the law.' 62
Adherence to the text alone, however, poses too many
interpretative problems. First, the text is generally insufficient to
determine statutory meaning because it is ambiguous, vague, or
incomplete. Language is imprecise. Words do not have clear
meaning outside of the context in which they are used. 163 Second, the
text often does not address the interpretative problem because of the
lack of congressional foresight or political will.l 64 Third, the text
does not foster a sensible reading of the statute that is designed to
carry out the legislative purpose. 165 Instead, the particular language is
isolated from the legislative enterprise of which it is a 
part. 66
Finally, textualism is built on "benign fiction" that legislators know
the canons of statutory construction, prior judicial precedents, and the
existing statutory terrain and that rational legislators write clear
text. 167 There is no support for these assumptions.
68
2. Intent
Since the text generally does not answer the interpretative
problem, the court must search through the "ashcans of the legislative
process" to discover how the original enacting legislature would have
resolved the question. Prof. William Eskridge provides a hierarchy
of the legislative sources, which is based on their comparative
reliability. 169  First, the most reliable sources are the committee





T. Alexander Alienkoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MiCH L. REV. 20,
22-24 (1988); Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 150, at 320.
'63Sunstein, supra note 153, at 418-24; J.A. Cony, The Use of Legislative History in
the Interpretation ofStatutes, 32 CAN. BAR REV. 624, 625 (1954); Eskridge and Frickey, supra
note 158, at 341-344.
164James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary On Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1,9-10 (1994).
16
5Eskridge, supra note 153, at 683; See also McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role
of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L. J. 705, 738 (1992); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1311-15
(1990); Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718, 727-28 (1987);




Eskridge, supra note 153, at 679-80; Zeppos, supra note 165, at 1311-15, Redish
and Chung, supra note 153, at 825-826.
168sd .
169Eskridge, supra note 153, at 636-640.
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Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed
legislation. " 170 The reports show areas of agreement between the
House and Senate and issues of disagreement that are resolved by the
conference committee. Second, the "statements by sponsors and/or
floor managers," who know the language, intent, and purpose of the
statute, are important because other congresspersons defer to their
judgment.17' Third, rejected proposals are relevant as "direct
evidence that Congress considered an issue and agreed not to adopt a
specified policy."'172 Fourth, the statements of legislators made in
committee hearings and on 'he floor, while not as authoritative as the
sponsors, show "the general assumptions made at the time a law was
enacted."173 Fifth, statements by nonlegislative drafters and sponsors
are generally not important, unless "the statute was a careful
compromise" or "there is virtually no other evidence." 174 Finally,
legislative silence and subsequent history are generally accorded little
weight, unless "the precise intent of the enacting Congress is
obscure."' 175 Reed Dickerson points out that respecting legislative
intent places the court in the proper deferential framework regarding
the legislature and establishes a criteria of reliability that helps the




The court must also be guided by the legislative purpose,
which is the ultimate motive of the legislature. Henry Hart and
Alfred Sacks assert that "every statute must be conclusively
presumed to be a purposive act."'177 The legislative purpose is the
best justification that can be attributed to the statute in terms of its
relationship with the set of legal norms operating at the time of the
court's decision. 178 The legislative purpose, which is more abstract
than intention, helps the court to determine the legislative intent,
directs the court when intent has not been manifested, and allows the









" 'd.,at 640; See also Ausness, supra note 158, at 242-243.
"16REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 71-79,
85-86 (1975).
'HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1124 (1994); See




" 9Vincent Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition, 29 ARIz. L. REV.
413, 463 (1987).
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Hart and Sacks assert that the attribution of purpose does not
grant the court unbridled discretion. 80 The court is constrained by
the words of the statute, which are enacted by the legislature, and
must be careful not to give the words "a meaning that they will not
bear."' 81 The words are not empty vessels into which the court pours
meaning, but have a dual role "as guides to the attribution of general
purpose and as factors limiting the particular meanings that can
properly be attributed."' 82 The words must not be given "a meaning
which would violate any established policy of clear statement." The
court must "try to put itself in imagination in the position of the
legislature which enacted the measure" and assume that the
"legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursing reasonable
purposes reasonably.'0 8 3 The court asks, "why would reasonable
men, confronted with the law as it was, have enacted this new law to
replace it."' 84 The court looks for the "mischief' in the prior statute
and "the true reason of the remedy" provided by the new statute.
1 85
The legislative history must be examined "for the light it throws on
the general purpose." 1
86
B. Analysis: Step One
The 10th Circuit's decision was consistent with the text,
intent, and purposes of section 10(j). Congressional inaction
regarding the FWS's interpretation and implementation of section
10(j), the enactment of appropriations for the program, and the
rejection of proposals jeopardizing wolf reintroduction indicates that
the FWS's decision was consistent with the "presumed intent" of
Congress. 1
87
1. Wholly Separate Geographically
Section 100)(1) requires the experimental population to be
"wholly separate geographically from nonexperimental populations
of the same species."' 88 The FWS defined a wolf population to be "at
least two breeding pairs of wild wolves successfully raising at least
two young each (until December 31 of the year of their birth), for 2






' See generally HART & SACKS, supra note 177, at 1374-80.
187William Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 108-
122 (1988).
'8 l6 U.S.C. § 1539,
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
consecutive years in an experimental area."' 8 9 The FWS drew the
boundaries for all known wolf packs in the northern Rockies,
following its practice of determining the boundaries of separately
listed populations.' 9" The FWS focused on breeding pairs with a
defined territory, rather than individual dispersers, which move great
distances.' 9' The boundary of the experimental population was based
on distribution of the wolf population in Montana. After studying the
experimental population area for two years, the FWS found that no
portion of the area was used by the breeding wolves in Montana.'
92
The FWS also determined that any wolf population inside
experimental boundaries would be the result of reintroduction or the
natural dispersal of wolves from Montana or Canada.' 
93
The district court accepted the FWS definition of population,
but determined that the reference to individuals and specimens in the
legislative history mandated that the experimental population be
"wholly separate geographically" from individual dispersers. 94
Furthermore, the district court found that there was no insurance that
the populations would remain separate because of migration and the
absence of any barriers.
195
The 10th Circuit reversed the district court. The 10th Circuit,
relying on Chevron, upheld the FWS's definition of population.
196
The 10th Circuit determined that "lone dispersers do not constitute a
population or even part of a population, since they are not in
'common spatial arrangement' sufficient to interbreed with other
members of a population."'197 Moveover, it was highly unlikely that
lone dispersers would meet another solitary wolf, breed, and produce
two pups yearly for two consecutive years. The populations left
behind by individual dispersing wolves were unlikely to expand
because the lone wolf would move on. 198
The 10th Circuit's decision, which upheld the FWS reliance
on breeding pairs, was consistent with text of section 10(j), which
refers to exclusively to populations. Population is not defined in the
text, but is used synonymously with species. The ESA defines a
species as "distinct population segment which interbreeds when
mature."' 99 The Secretary of the Interior generally defines population
"959 Fed. Reg. 60,252, 60,256 (1994); Babbit, 987 F.Supp., at 1371; Wyoming, 199
F.3d, at 1234.








'96Wyoming. 199 F-3d., at 1234.
1971d.
Id., at 1234-36.
"*16 U.S.C. § 1532(15).
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as "a group of fish or wildlife.. .in common spatial arrangement that
interbreed when mature."200  The FWS definition was also
harmonious with the plain meaning of population, which refers to a
group, not an individual.20' Webster's dictionary defines population
as "organisms inhabiting a particular area of biotype."
202
The 10th Circuit decision was also consistent with legislative
intent. The district court relied on statements in the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee report regarding overlap of natural
and experimental populations. 203 The House report states:
The Committee carefully considered how to treat
introduced populations that overlap in whole or in
part, [with] natural populations of the same
species. To protect natural populations and to
avoid potentially complicated problems of law
enforcement, the definition [of experimental
population] is limited to those introduced
populations that are wholly separate
geographically from nonexperimental populations
of the same species. Thus, for example, in the
case of the introduction of individuals of a listed
fish species into a portion of a stream where the
same species already occurs, the introduced
specimens would not be treated as an
'experimental population' separate from the non-
introduced specimens.. .If an introduced
population overlaps with natural populations of
the same species during a portion of the year, but
is wholly separate at other times, the introduced
population is to be treated as an experimental
population at such times as it is wholly separate.
The Committee intends, however, that such
population be treated as experimental only when
the times of geographic separation are reasonably
predictable and not when separation occurs as a
""50 C.F.R. § 17.3; Wvonung, 199 F.3d, at 1234.
2 'The plain meaning rule dictates that "where the language of an enactment is clear
and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences,
the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended." U.S. v.
Missouri Pac. R.R, 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); See generally, Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims
Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutorv Interpretation in the Modern Federal
Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975)_
202WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1766, 3(b)(1) (3d ed.
1986).
203987 F.Supp., at 1372-73.
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
result of random and unpredictable events.2 °4
This language does not show concern with individuals, but
indicates that individuals cannot be introduced into a natural
population and be considered an experimental population. Instead,
the language demonstrates that when the experimental and natural
populations overlap, the experimental population is accorded
endangered species status, the same degree of protection afforded to
the natural population.
The legislative history demonstrates congressional concern
with populations, not individuals. In the House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee report, "population" or "populations" are
referred to sixteen times, "individuals" one time, and "specimens"
two times. 20 5 Two noted experts, Michael J. Bean and Melanie J.
Rowland, declared that "the legislative history is clear that it is the
population itself, and not its individual members, that is to be treated
as threatened. ,
206
This issue was specifically discussed by the 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. McKittrick.0 7  McKittrick was
convicted of killing a wolf that was part of an experimental
population. He claimed that the experimental population designation
was invalid because the wolves were not "wholly separate
geographically" from the naturally occurring wolves present in
Yellowstone.0 8  The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals specifically
rejected the district court's reasoning in Wyoming Farm Bureau
Federation.20 9  It upheld the FWS findings that the experimental
population of gray wolves were wholly geographically separate and
no natural populations were in the area. The 9th Circuit concluded
that "sporadic sitings of isolated indigenous wolves in the release
area, lone wolves, or 'dispersers,' do not constitute a population."
2 1 0
The 10th Circuit decision was consistent with the statutory
purposes in that the ESA was concerned with the "conservation,
protection, restoration, and propagation of species of fish, wildlife,
and plants facing extinction. 2 11 The FWS definition of population to
21AH.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 33 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2833;
See also S. REP. No. 97-418, at 7-8 (1982).
"0 5U.S. v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cit. 1998).
2t*BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 12, at 233; See also Causey, supra note 60, at 466.
20TMcKittrick, 142 F.3d. at 1174-75; Jennifer Li, The Wolves may have won the
Battle, but not the War: How the West was won under the Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf
Recovery Plan, 30 ENVTL. L. 677 (2000); Daniel R. Dinger, supra note 61.
aa8McKittrick. 142 F.3d, at 1174.2091d., at 1175
2 Id., at 1175.
"'S. REP. No. 93-307, at I (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989; See also
Wvoming, 199 F.3d., at 123 1.
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be breeding pairs was based on reproduction and sustainability.
21 2
The FWS definition was also consistent with wolf biology. The gray
wolf is a social animal that "lives in packs of related individuals that
range in size from two to twenty-five." 21 3  The wolf pack, not
individuals, are the crucial social unit. The wolf pack is central for
breeding, hunting, feeding, teaching, rest, and play. The pack
establishes and defends its territory, which "range from 125 km to
over 2541 km; ranges of unmated individuals are larger and are not
defended., 214  The gray wolves maintain their territories through
howling and scent markings. 2 ' 5 Lone wolves who are unmated scent
mark infrequently, "whereas newly formed pairs scent-mark
frequently until they become established., 216  Most importantly,
"because of the large distances that dispersing individuals may move
and the abundance of potential dispersers, individual gray wolves
occur outside the species range in the lower 48 
states."2 17
2. Current Range
Section 10(j)(2)(a) states that the Secretary "may authorize
the release...of any population (including eggs, propagules, or
individual) of any endangered species or a threatened species outside
the current range of such species if the Secretary determines that such
release will further the conservation of such species."
2 I8 The FWS
utilized the sum total of pack territory to establish the current range
of the species. '9 There had been wolf sitings in Montana, Idaho, and
Wyoming since the 1970s, but there was no documentation of any
breeding pairs within the experimental population area.
220 There was
no geographical overlap between the Montana wolf population's
home range and the experimental area.22 1 The northern boundary of
the Idaho experimental area was moved further south when active
breeding pairs from Montana located south of experimental boundary
212 Brief of Amici Curiae, Envtl. Defense Fund, World Wildlife Fund, Wildlife
Conservation Society, Izaak Walton League of America, Idaho Conservation League, Wolf
Recovery Foundation, and Center for Marine Conservation, 16.213Reply Brief for lntervenor-Defendants-Appellants National Wildlife Federation,
Defenders of Wildlife, National Audubon Society, et al., 2-4; Wildlife Society, The Restoration
of the Wolves in North America 6-7(1991), cited in U.S. House, Committee on Resources,








2171d-21816 U.S.C. § 1539.
"195 9 Fed. Reg., at 60,259.
2201d
2211d.
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recommended in the proposed rule.222 If any natural wolf population
was discovered in the experimental population area within ninety
days, the experimental population would be removed.223
The district court held that "the plain language of section
10(j)(2)(a) speaks to the range of 'species' without reference to a
'population'. 2 24  Finding that the range of individual dispersers
constituted the current range of the species, the district court held that
the release of the experimental population was not outside of the
current range of the species. 2" The district court did not equate the
range of wolf packs with the range of the species. 226
The 10th Circuit rejected the district court's interpretation.22 7
The 10th Circuit determined that the territory occupied by a single
wolf did not constitute the current range of the species.228 The court
held that the definition of species must be consistent with
conservation and recovery. 229 The FWS properly focused on distinct,
interbreeding population segments or subspecies, not individual
animals.230  The 10th Circuit declared that, "an individual animal
does not a species, population or population segment make. "
231
The 10th Circuit's decision, which upheld the FWS
determination that the current range of the species is comprised by
wolf populations and not individual dispersers, was consistent with
the text of the statute. Range is not defined in statute. Webster's
dictionary defines range as "the region to which a plant or animal is
native. 2 32 Native assumes a regular ongoing presence that depends
on the existence of a breeding pair.233  Prominent wolf experts
support the position that a single wolf does not establish the current
range of the species. 234  A report by prominent wolf experts
concluded that, "[b]ecause of the large distance that dispersing
individuals may move and the abundance of potential dispersers,
individual gray wolves occur outside the species range in the lower
48 states."23
The district court's interpretation of the statutory text was
2221d.
2231d.
224 Babbit, 987 F.Supp., at 1375.
2251d.226
1d.
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mistaken. The text refers to "the current range of such species.
"236
Species is used synonymously with population in the ESA . Species
is defined as a "distinct population segment which interbreeds when
mature."2 38 This assumes a breeding pair. A more accurate reading
of the text is that the current range of the species refers to areas where
the populations, which are individuals belonging to packs, reside.
The FWS determination that the experimental population area was
not within the current range of any natural population of wolves was
consistent with section 100)(2).
The district court's definition that anywhere an individual
was found constituted "the current range of such species" was too
broad. Species have specific ranges, which depend on their
biological characteristics. 239 The ranges can vary depending on
natural and man-made events.24 ) However, if the trade winds blow a
single bird across the ocean or an animal becomes a stowaway on a
far-ranging vessel, these individuals do not expand the species
current range.241  A noted expert, Michael J. Bean, referring to
congressional consideration of section 10(), wrote that, "I can say
with reasonable confidence that had we been asked, for example,
whether any part of the U.S. is within the current range of the
European sparrow hawk, we would have said no, even though
occasional aberrant individuals of that species show up here. 
,2 2
3. The Status of Dispersers
The status of natural individual wolves that migrate into the
experimental population area was a crucial issue in the litigation.
The FWS acknowledged that wolves can migrate over 500 miles, but
there was no evidence of wolves in central Idaho or Yellowstone for
past ten years. ' 3 The FWS admitted that from a management
standpoint it would be difficult to determine if a wolf were a member
of the experimental population or a natural disperser.244 The initial
experimental population would be collared and differentiated. 45
Once they reproduced, it would be difficult to distinguish between
23616 U.S.C. § 1539(15), 10()(2)(a).
2
7
16 U.S.C. § 1532(15).




2 2Letter from Michael Bean, Envtl. Defense Fund, to Doug Hannold, Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund, cited in Reply and Answering Brief of Federal Appellants/Cross-
Appellees, 10 n.4.
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members of the experimental population and natural dispersers.
246
This distinction could not be dealt with by regulation.
247
Furthermore, an individual disperser might arrive in the experimental
population area, stay, and mate.248  This would increase the
population, but would not have a major impact because the majority
of the breeding wolves would be reintroduced animals. 249 The FWS
regulation avoided any conflict by treating all wolves in the
experimental population area as a threatened species.250 The FWS
concluded that the viable wolf population would be enhanced by the
reintroduction of thirty wolves annually for next three to five years.
I25
The district court held that full ESA protection must be
accorded to individual wolves, which are not members of the
experimental population, if they are present in the experimental
population area. 5  The classification of all natural wolves in the
experimental population area as a nonessential experimental
population with only threatened species status constituted a defacto
delisting of wolves and denied them and their offspring full ESA
protection as an endangered species.
253
The 10th Circuit disagreed with the district court.25 4 The
10th Circuit held that the ESA granted broad discretion to the
Secretary regarding experimental populations. 255  The FWS
determined that no wolf populations were present in the experimental
256population area. Wolves would migrate, so the intermingling of
the natural and experimental populations might occur.15 7 The best
management strategy was to treat all wolves in the experimental
population area as part of the experimental population.
25 8
The 10th Circuit's decision was consistent with the text,
intent, and purposes of section 10(j), which grants the Secretary
broad discretionary authority regarding the experimental population.
Section 100)(2) allows the Secretary to release the experimental
population and determine if it is essential or nonessential. 259 Section
100)(3) permits the Secretary to redesignate a population as
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The legislative history supports the delegation of broad
authority to the Secretary regarding section 10j). The House
Conference Committee report states that "the purpose of requiring the
Secretary to proceed by regulation ...is to provide a vehicle for the
development of special regulations for each experimental population
that will address the particular needs of the population. "
261 The
experimental population is treated as threatened species.
262  The
House Conference Committee report states that "this provision
obliges the Secretary to issue such regulations as he deems necessary
and advisable to provide for the conservation of the experimental
population... ' '263  The Secretary is granted "broad flexibility in
promulgating regulations to protect such species.
264
Section 100) allows the Secretary to establish an
experimental population according to its location, not 
its origin.265
The House Conference Committee report states that the Secretary can
identify the experimental population "on the basis of location,
migration pattern, or any other criteria that would provide notice as to
which populations of endangered or threatened species are
experimental.,
266
Congress understood that the status of individual dispersers
depended upon their location. When a species is listed, the Secretary
establishes its status as endangered or threatened depending on its
location. The Secretary can treat different populations of the same
species differently. A species, which is used synonymously with
population in the ESA, is defined as a "distinct population segment
which interbreeds when mature., 267 The legislative history shows
that a population can be a distinct portion of species or subspecies.
The House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee report
accompanying the ESA stated that "species" is defined "broadly
enough to include any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, or any
population of such species.
2 68
The Secretary utilized this discretionary authority to extend
different levels of protection to different populations of the same
species depending on their location.269 For example, grizzly bears
south of the Canadian border were listed as threatened, while those
26 1H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-835, at 34 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.




2616 U.S.C. § 1539(j).
211H.R. REP. NO. 97-304, at 34 (1982).
26716 U.S.C. § 1532(15).
'"H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at I (1973).26BriefofAmici Curiae, Environmental Defense Fund et al., 6-10.
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north of the border were unlisted.270 Alligators were once listed as
endangered everywhere except in three Louisiana parishes. 27' Until
1978, bald eagles were listed as endangered south of 40 degrees north
latitude, while those to the north were unlisted.272 In 1978, wolves
were listed as an endangered species in the lower 48 states, except
Minnesota where they were considered only to be threatened.273
The General Accounting Office (GAO) was critical of the
Interior's ability to attribute a different status to different populations
of the same species. 74 The GAO recommended an amendment that
would prevent the FWS from listing geographically limited
populations of vertebrates as threatened or endangered. 75 The GAO
contended that this authority allowed the FWS to list squirrels in one
park as endangered, while the same species of squirrels were
abundant in other parks in same city.276  The FWS and NMFS
opposed any change, declaring that "it would severely limit their
ability to require the appropriate level of protection for a species
based on its actual biological status., 277 The agencies noted that one
of the improvements in the 1973 ESA from the preceding 1969 Act
was the ability of the "FWS to adopt different management practices
for health, threatened or endangered populations.2 78  Congress
rejected the GAO suggestion.279  The Senate Interior Committee
declared that "there may be instances in which the FWS should
provide for different levels of protection for populations of the same
species." 280
The individual dispersers can be viewed in the same manner
as a distinct population segment. This does not mean that individual
dispersers constitute a discrete population segment, but only that they
should receive similar treatment. The FWS noted that a distinct
population segment "may be circumscribed a set of experimental
conditions, or ...may refer to a loosely bounded, regionally distributed
collection of organisms., 28 1 The designation of a discrete population
segment is "aimed at carrying out the purposes of the Act.
2 82
To achieve this status, the FWS requires the population to be
270Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 CFR § 17.11 (h) (1997).
27'40 Fed. Reg. 44412 (Sept. 26, 1975).
27250 C.F.R. § 17.1 l(i) (1977), revised 43 Fed. Reg. 6233 (Feb. 14, 1978).
2743 Fed. Reg. 9612 (March 9, 1978), 50 C.F.R. § 17.1 1(h)(1997).
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discrete.283 The FWS defines discrete as "markedly separate from
other populations of the same taxon." Individual dispersers are by
definition separate from the taxon. The nonessential experimental
population should not be considered as part of the taxon, which is
assumed in the statute. Boundaries can be established for a discrete
population, such as the experimental population area. The FWS
noted that political boundaries are appropriate in some cases to
delimit discrete population segments, stating that:
infra-national political boundaries offer
opportunities to provide incentives for the
favorable management of species if they were
used as a basis for recognizing discrete entities for
delisting or for exclusion from a listing.
Particularly when applied to the delisting or
reclassification of a relatively widespread species
for which a recovery program is being
284
successfully carried out in some States...
The FWS stressed that a discrete population segment does not
"require absolute reproductive isolation as a prerequisite to
recognizing a distinct population segment.,
285 Individual dispersers
satisfy this requirement.
The FWS also considers the significance of the discrete
population segment. The FWS acknowledges that the "precise
circumstances are likely to vary considerably from case 
to case," 286
but notes that the key criteria regarding significance is their
"importance to the overall welfare of the species they 
represent. ' 287
Individual dispersers are significant because they pose a threat to the
establishment of the experimental populations specifically designed
to ensure species conservation.
Section 10(j) was enacted to increase the chances of
successful recovery of endangered species. The Secretary is granted
discretion to overcome local opposition and achieve cooperation.
288
Congress assumed that some individual species would lose their
protection. 289 This is necessary to enable section 100) to function
properly. The experimental population is usually taken from the
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The protection granted to the individual decreases when it becomes
part of the experimental population.29' The Secretary is granted
broad authority to retroactively designate any. previously introduced
population to be an experimental population, changing its status from
endangered to threatened.292 Furthermore, the Secretary can allow
for incidental takings, 293 which are prohibited by section 9, if it is
"necessary for the establishment and maintenance of experimental
populations pursuant to subsection (j) of this section."294 Congress
was specifically concerned with wolf reintroduction, as manifested in
the legislative history. The House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee report states that the experimental population regulations
"could allow for the directed taking of experimental populations...
such as red wolves...if depredations occur or if the release of these
populations will continue to be frustrated by local opposition."
296
Treating the individual dispersers as part of the experimental
population furthers the primary purpose of the ESA to conserve
wildlife. The ESA recognizes that extinction is "a consequence of
economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern
and conservation... "it provides "a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may
be conserved., 297 Conservation is defined to mean the "use and use
of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the
measure provided.. .are no longer necessary. 29  The 9th Circuit
declared that, "[t]he statutes essential purpose...is the conservation of
species. 2 99 The Supreme Court announced that "the plain intent of
Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend
towards species extinction whatever the cost."
300
A narrow interpretation of section 10(j) would frustrate the
Secretary's ability to carry out its purposes. The survival of the
species is greater than the protection of an individual and the species
cannot be sacrificed to protect an individual. Species protection was




293The Secretary can permit an incidental taking, if after reviewing the permit
application and conservation plan, she determines that "(i) the taking will be incidental; (ii) the
applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such
taking; (iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will be provided; (iv)
the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species
in the wild; and (v) the measures, if any, required under subparagraph (A)(iv) will be met."
29416 U.S.C. § 1539.
W96H.R. EP. No. 97-567, at 34 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, at
2834.
29 7
16 U.S.C. § 1531.
29 16 U.S.C. § 1532.299McKinrick, 142 F.3d, at 1174.3 afennessee Valley Authority v Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
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Conference Committee report stated that, "[i]n enacting the ESA,
Congress recognized that individual species should not be viewed in
isolation, but must be viewed in terms of their relationship to the
ecosystem of which they form a constituent element302 Although the
regulatory mechanisms of the Act focus on species that are formally
listed as endangered or threatened, the purposes and policies of the
Act are far broader than simply providing for the conservation of
individual species or individual members of listed species."
30 2
Another specific purpose of section 10(j) is "to avoid potentially
complicated problems of law enforcement. "30 3 According the same
treatment to all of the wolves in the experimental area accomplished
this purpose.
The Secretary established the experimental population area
where no known natural population of wolves lived and outside of
the current range of the natural population. This was consistent with
past practice of determining boundaries of separate listed
populations. Individual dispersers that arrived in the experimental
population area would be treated like a distinct population and
receive the same status as the experimental population. This was
consistent with the ESA, which recognizes that an individual's status
is dependent on its location. It also avoided any law enforcement
problems. The experimental population was designed to further
species conservation. The diminishment of the individual dispersers
status was not as significant as the preservation of the species.
4. Legislative Inaction
Congress was well aware of the Interior's wolf reintroduction
plan, including the definitions of population and current range, the
intermingling of individual dispersers with the experimental
population, and the possible status change of the wolves. The failure
of Congress to act, the continual support of reintroduction through
appropriations, and the rejection of proposals that threatened wolf
reintroduction demonstrate congressional acquiescence to the FWS
statutory interpretation.304  The Supreme Court has held that
congressional inaction represents congressional acquiescence to the
agency's decision.0 5 The Court stated that congressional failure to




H.R. CONF. REIP. No. 97-835, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 287 2.
302
1d.303id.
304See generally Eskridge, supra note 187.
305Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 568 (1984); See also, Bob Jones
University v. U.S., 451 U.S 574,600 (1983).
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implies that the regulations accurately reflect congressional intent."
30 6
The Court also held that deference is appropriate when "an agency
interpretation involves issues of considerable public controversy, and
Congress has not acted to correct any misperception of its statutory
objectives. 
30 7
The 1987 wolf recovery plan sought to achieve recovery in 3
areas: northwest Montana, central Idaho, and Yellowstone. The plan
noted that if the wolves in any area increased sufficiently, they would
be reclassified as threatened, while others would remain endangered.
There was no contemplation of any barriers between populations.
Instead, the plan sought to bring about such movement by
maintaining suitable travel corridors among populations. As the
individual wolves moved, so did their status.
30 8
In 1991, Congress instructed Interior to consider the wolf
committee's plan as an alternative in the EIS. The draft EIS
discussed lone wolves in the experimental population area, but
adhered to the FWS definition of population. The FWS quarterly
reports to Congress before the Final EIS (FEIS) indicated the possible
intermingling of individual dispersers with members of the
experimental population. The FEIS addressed the possible
intermingling of the natural and experimental populations. The
final regulation specifically addressed the intermingling of dispersers
with the experimental population.
310
Congress not only acquiesced, but also supported the FWS
decisions by continually appropriating funds for the reintroduction.
The appropriations process is one of the principal ways to enact and
influence policy.311 Professor Kate Stith noted that "appropriations
limitations ...constitute a low cost vehicle for effective legislative
control over executive activity."312 Professor Harold Bruff observed
that "yearly budgetary hearings in both houses provide an opportunity
for the appropriations committees to review agency performance, and
to affect future policy either by changing appropriation levels or by




United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 n. 10 (1979).
30 8
Brief ofAmicus Curiae, Environmental Defense Fund et al., 9.
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Brief for Federal Appellants, 31-32.
31059 Fed. Reg., at 60,261.
311 See generally, Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through
Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L. J. 456; Deskins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the
Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L. J. 389; Jonathan R. Macey, Separated
Powers and Positive Political Theory: Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L. J.
671, 700-702 (1992).
312Kate Stith, Congress'Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L. J. 1356, 1360 (1988).
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Harold H.Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.
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Congress initially refused to authorize funding for an EIS,
but appropriated funds for wolf studies. In 1992, Congress specially
authorized the funding for the EIS, then later funded the project.
314
Even after the Republicans took control of Congress in 1995,315 funds
continued to be appropriated for wolf reintroduction. In 1995,
Senator Bums (R-Mont.), an opponent of wolf reintroduction,
attempted to add language to the Interior appropriation bill that would
bar bringing any additional wolves into Yellowstone.3 16 This effort
failed, but the FWS annual $600,000 budget for wolf reintroduction
was reduced by one-third.317  In 1998, Representative Helen
Chenoweth (R-Ida.) sponsored an amendment to the National Fish
and Wildlife Foundation reauthorization bill, which prohibited the
recipient of a Foundation grant from using the funds "for any activity
related to the introduction of wolves or grizzly bears in Idaho,
Montana, Utah, or Wyoming."318 The amendment, which passed by a
voice vote in the House Resources Committee, was not included in
final bill.319  Congress continued to appropriate funds for the
monitoring of wolves in Yellowstone and central Idaho.32 °
Another reliable indicator of congressional acquiescence is
the proposals rejected by the Congress. Rejected proposals indicate
that Congress specifically considered the administrative action and
refused to act.321 The Supreme Court stated that "[o]ne must assume
that a deliberate policy decision informed Congress' rejection of these
alternatives in favor of the language presently contained in the
[statute]." '322 The Republicans gained control of Congress in 1995,
promising to decrease federal regulatory activities, increase state
control, protect private property rights, and decrease environmental
controls.32 3 There were several efforts to reauthorized and amend the
3 14H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-256, at 16-17 (1991); See also Strauch. supra note 52.
at 67. 3 15According the League of Conservation Voters from 1995 through 1999, the
Republicans achieved average scores of 13 in the Senate and 20 in the House regarding pro-
environmental measures. While the Democrats averaged scores of 83 in the Senate and 74 in
the House during the same period. League of Conservation Voters, National Environmental
Scorecards 1995-1999; See also, 1996 Congressional Quarterly Almanac 4-3, 4-4.3 16Jim Robbins, With return of Wolves to the West, Predatory Habits Bring Back
Fear and Anger, N.Y. TIMES, December 29, 1995, at A 1.
31fId.
3 1
8H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-483, at 8-9 (1998).
3191998 Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2:57-63.
320 H.R. REP. No. 104-259, at 26 (1995); S. REP. No. 105-125, at 18 (1995); S.
REP. NO. 104-319, at 16 (1996); S. REP. No. 105-56, at 21 (1997); S. REP- No. 105-227, at
17-18 (1998).
I Eskridge, supra note 187, at 84-89.
322
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 248 (1978).
32354 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports 2441 (August 31, 1996).
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ESA, which would have changed the focus of section 106).324 In
1995, Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) introduced legislation that
required the Secretary to identify the "precise boundaries of the
geographic area for the release" and determine "whether the release is
in the public interest."325 No member of the experimental population
found outside of the release area would "be treated as a threatened
species if the member poses a threat to the welfare of the public."
326
The release of the experimental population should only occur in
national parks and wildlife refuges.27 Any release outside these
areas could only occur if the area had been identified as a candidate
cite in the recovery plan.328 In such a case, "measures to protect the
safety and welfare of the public and domestic animals" must be
identified in the regulation. Any release on non-federal land must
have "the written consent of the owner of the land. 3 29 The regulation
must "include measurable reintroduction goals to restore viable
population only with the specific geographic area identified for
release. 330  This bill ceased to receive serious consideration after
Senator Gorton admitted that significant sections of the bill were
written by lawyers for the mining, timber, and grazing industries.
3 31
In 1995, the House Resources Committee reported an ESA
reauthorization bill, which amended section 100).3 32 The bill, which
followed the American Farm Bureau Federation's
recommendations, 333  required the Secretary to limit predator
reintroduction to national parks or wildlife refuges. 334 If predators
were reintroduced elsewhere, measures had to be taken to protect
public safety and welfare. 335 The Secretary was required to comply
with state laws regarding the reintroduced species.3 36  If a state
enacted legislation prohibiting the release of a specific species, the
324James E. Satterfield, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Revolution: The
Environmental Record of the 104th Congress, 27 ELR 10,019, 10,032 (1997).
325S. REP. No. 104-768 (1995); Discussed in, 141 Cong. Rec. S6337, S6339-
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Secretary could not release the species.337 This bill was not
enacted.338
There is an ongoing debate regarding the interpretative
significance of legislative inaction. 339 William Eskridge points out
that legislative inaction is generally not a significant factor in
statutory interpretation. 340 Eskridge identifies several problems with
efforts to infer legislative intent from legislative inaction.34 1 From
the formalist perspective, the acts of a subsequent Congress are not
reliable indicators of the intent of the enacting Congress and
President.342 From the realist perspective, it is difficult to discern any
collective intent and easier to halt, rather than advance, legislative
action.343  From the public choice perspective, interest group
influence in Congress and subgovernment opposition frustrates the
possibility of action. 344 Nevertheless, Eskridge argues that legislative
inaction should be attributed some significance. The failure of
Congress to change "building block" interpretations by administrative
agencies indicates that the interpretations are consistent with the
"presumed intent" of Congress. 345 This weak presumption assumes
that two other preconditions are met. First, those adversely affected
by the interpretation have access to Congress.346  Second, the
interpretation was consistent with the text, intent, and purposes of the
statute.347 Both of these preconditions were satisfied regarding wolf
reintroduction in the northern Rockies. Eskridge asserts that the
attribution of significance to legislative inaction improves horizontal
coherence, keeping the law in harmony with current policies, and
avoids the problems of vertical coherence, which stresses continuity
348over time.
Congressional inaction was also significant when viewed
through the lens of positive political theory, which perceives
33 7
1d.
338Satterfield, supra note 324, at 10,031-32.
339 John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search.for Legislative Intent: A
Venture into "Speculative Unrealities, " 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1985); Brudney, supra note 164,
at 66-68; Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid, 57 IND. L. J. 515 (1982);
Eskridge, supra note 187, at 67.34 0Eskridge, supra note 153, at 636-40.




34 5Eskridge asserts that building block interpretations are "authoritative, well-settled
interpretations upon which public and/or private parties reasonably rely to carry out their roles
under the statute." Id., at 108
3461d.
347 Eskridge, supra note 187, at 108-122.
348ir., at 122-24.
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governmental institutions as rational actors competing to have their
policy preference prevail. 349 The constitutional system of separation
of powers and checks and balances provides each institution with
some authority over the other institutions. Each institution sends and
responds to the signals sent by other institutions to avoid the reversal
of its positions. 35 0  Congress delegates authority to the executive
agency to implement the law and retains authority to check the
agency's decision through oversight, amendments, and
appropriations. 351 Congressional inaction shows agreement with the
agency's statutory interpretation because Congress can easily send
signals to the agency. 352 Legislative inaction also provides support
for Chevron because it demonstrates the reasonability of the
administrative interpretation.
C. Chevron: Step Two
If Congress has not addressed the issue, the court can "not
simply impose its own construction on the statute." The court must
move to the second step and determine "whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute." The court does
not have to conclude that the agency's construction is "the only one it
permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even
the reading the court would have reached if the question had arisen in
a judicial proceeding." Instead, the court must defer to "a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of the agency."
353
Judges are admonished not to read their policy preferences
into the law because they lack expertise and are not accountable to
the electorate. 354 Congress delegated power to the agency, which can
''properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise
policy to inform its judgments."355  The President makes policy
choices that "resolve the competing interest which Congress itself
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute
in light of everyday realities."
356
The courts must be careful when relying on step two of
34 9William N. Eskridge, Post Enactment Legislative Signals, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 75 (1994); Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Forward: Positive Political Theory
in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L J. 457,462 (1992).
3501d.
35 tMacey, supra note 311, at 700-03.
352
Eskridge, supra note 349, at 82.
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Chevron. The courts have the constitutional authority to interpret the
law. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton stated that, "The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts." 35 7 Judges determine "the meaning of any particular act
proceeding from the legislative body. 3 58 Justice Marshall reiterated
this view in Marbury v. Madison, commenting that, "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is."3 59 Justice Reed later noted that, "[t]he interpretation
of the meaning of statutes...is exclusively ajudicial function.
360
The courts play an important role in overseeing
administrative actions to ensure conformity with the statutory
mandate. Judicial review ensures the executive branch faithfully
executes the law and acts within the parameters of the statute to carry
out its purposes. 36 1  Judicial review prevents agency capture and
keeps the agency accountable to Congress and ultimately to the
voters.362  This advances the constitutional separation of powers,
checks and balances, and democratic theory.363
Judicial reliance on Chevron poses additional problems.
Prof. Cass Sunstein points out that the agencies lack the institutional
capabilities to determine legal questions. Chevron fails to distinguish
between the delegation of interpretative powers and statutory
ambiguities. Chevron is based on a misconception of statutory
interpretation. 364  The question was not whether Congress has
precisely addressed the issue, but whether the statute requires or
forbids administrative action. 365  Chevron fails to recognize that
interest groups will dominate executive agencies. 366 Judicial review
is necessary to prevent self-interested decisions, "foxes should not
guard henhouses.
3 67
357Federalist No- 78, at467 (A- Hamilton)(C. Rossiter, ed. 1961), cited in Henry P.
Monaghan, Marbur' and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1983).358
Id.
359Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
360U.S.v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
36 1Abner J- Mikva, How the Courts Should Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM.
U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
Injuries, and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 212 (1993).3621d.
363d.
364Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
466-69,488-99 (1987); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance ofPower in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452,478-88(1989); Alfred Aman, Administrative
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The courts utilize Chevron in a strong or weak manner.368 A
strong reading requires the court to defer to the agency's legal
interpretation unless Congress has specifically addressed the legal
issue.369 A weak reading stresses the continued use of the tradition
tools of statutory interpretation. 370 Only when these tools fail to yield
an answer to the legal issue is the court required to defer to the
agency's legal interpretation. Justice Stevens, the author of the
Chevron decision, later stated that a "pure question of statutory
construction [is] for the courts to decide" by "employing traditional
tools of statutory construction. "371 The Supreme Court has vacillated
between strong and weak readings of Chevron. For example,
between 1984 and 1990, the Court invoked Chevron in approximately
one third of the appropriate cases.37 2 Other courts have manifested
the same ambivalence.3 73  The selective application of Chevron
indicates that the courts still have an important role to play in
statutory interpretation. Chevron should only be viewed as a
judicially-imposed prudential concern that is to be applied in a
flexible manner.
374
D. Analysis: Step Two
Both the district court and 10th Circuit adopted a weak
version of Chevron. Both courts analyzed the text, intent, and
purposes and only deferred to Interior's decisions, which was
consistent with the findings of their traditional approach. The district
court refused to accept Interior's statutory interpretations, but the 10th
Circuit properly reversed the district court.
Interior's decision regarding wolf reintroduction pursuant to
section 10(j) was reasonable. Section 10(j) delegated broad
368
Kenneth W. Starr, Cass R. Sunstein, Richard K. Willard, Alan B. Morrison,
Judicial Review ofAdministrative Action in a Conservative Era (panel discussion), 39 ADMIN.
L. REV. 353, 367 (1987).3 69
Steven Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 373, 377-379 (1986).370See generally, Sunstein, supra note 364,466-469; See also, Starr, supra note 368,
at 367; See also, Breyer, supra note 369, at 373, 377-379.3 7 1 IN5 v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446 (1987); See also Callahan, supra note
151, at 1295-99.3 72
Merrill, supra note 151, at 981; Richard C. Pierce, Two Problems in
Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 312-13 n.82, Peter L. Strauss, One and Fifty Cases
Per Year, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1092,1118-19 (1987). Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliot, To
the Chevron Station, 1990 DUKE L. J. 984, 984-1077. Callahan, supra note 151, at 1294-99.
Patricia Wald, 'The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law," 40 ADMIN. L.
REV. 507, 530 (1988); Garrett, 10 Nat. Res. and Envt, at 78-79.373
Jd.
374
Merrill, supra note 151, at 1002, Mikva, supra note 361, at 9; Breyer, supra note
369, at 381; Garrett, 10 Nat. Res. and Envt. at 59; Callahan, supra note 15 1, at 1296-1297.
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discretionary authority to the Secretary regarding experimental
populations.3 75 The definitions of population and current range, as
well as the status of individual dispersers, were issues, which
Congress intended for the agency to determine. These were also
issues of scientific and technical expertise within the realm of agency
expertise to which the courts generally defer.376 Congress accepted
and supported the FWS decision, which successfully reintroduced the
gray wolf into the northern Rockies. The district court did not
properly defer to the FWS decisions on these matters, but substituted
its own views. The district court failed to follow its own admonition
that "under Chevron, considerable deference is accorded to the
agency's interpretation of the statute, and such an interpretation
should not be disturbed 'unless it appears from the statute or its




The FWS compliance with the NEPA was another issue in
the litigation. The FWS determined that "no evidence exists that wolf
populations persisted in the northern Rocky Mountains of the
U.S.[since their extirpation in the 1930's] to the present time, or that
lone wild wolves occasionally reported the these areas are other than
dispersing wolves from Canadian populations." 3 8 The FWS also
found that recent taxonomic research indicates that little genetic
difference exists among North American wolves and suggests that
gray wolves throughout North America are all one subspecies of
canis lupus." 379 As a result the EIS did not discuss any alleged
impacts on indigenous wolves and wolf subspecies. 380 The Urbigkits,
a couple who studied the wolves in Yellowstone, claimed that the
failure of the EIS to discuss the impact of the reintroduction of the
Canadian gray wolves on the indigenous subspecies of natural wolves
in the area, canis lupus irremotus, violated the NEPA.38' The
Urbigkits cited the work of a noted wolf expert, Dr. Nowak, to
375H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 33-34.
376The Supreme Court stated, "When an agency is charged with administering a
statute, part of the authority it receives is the power to give reasonable content to the statutes
textual ambiguities...That is a task infused with judgment and discretion, requiring the
'accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care.'" IRS v.
FLRA, 494 US. 922, 933 (1990); See also, Babbit, 987 F.Supp., at 1371.377See also, Babbit. 987 F.Supp.. at 1371, citing Chevron. 467 U.S., at 843-44.





3 81Rabbit, 987 F.Supp., at 1356, 1367-69.




Both the district court and the 10th Circuit properly rejected
the Urbigkit's NEPA claims.
383 The 10th Circuit explained that the
NEPA identifies a process, not any particular results.
394 The record
must only show that the agency took a "hard look" at environmental
consequences. 38  The court cannot second guess the agency's
ultimate decision.38 6 The 10th Circuit found that the FWS adequately
analyzed the claim regarding the existence of the subspecies 
of
natural wolves and the supporting research.
387 The existence of




The reintroduction of the gray wolf into the northern Rockies
pursuant to section 10(j) of ESA demonstrates the dynamic
relationship between Congress, administrative agencies, and the
courts. Following prolonged negotiations with Congress, the FWS
reintroduced experimental populations of gray wolves into central
Idaho and Yellowstone in 1995 and 1996.389 This generated
litigation, which focused on the FWS's interpretation of section
10().
390
When looking at an agency's legal interpretation, the court
utilizes the two step conceptual framework provided in Chevron v.
NRDC. In step one, the court employs the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation to determine if Congress addressed the
interpretative issue.
391 If Congress did not address the problem, the
court proceeds to step two to determine if the agency's interpretation
is reasonable.3 92 However, the court must be cautious when utilizing
step two of Chevron.
The federal district court determined that the reintroduction
violated section 10(j),
393 and that the experimental populations of
wolves were not "wholly separate geographically" from the natural
3921d., at 1368.
383 1d., at 1366-69; Wyoming, 199 F3d, at 1240-41.










See Beisher, supra note 1, at 417.
390
1d.
391Chevron, 467 U.S., at 842.
392Id.. at 842-845.
393
See supra p. 12.
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population or released outside the "current range" of the natural
population because individual dispersers could migrate into the
experimental population area.394 Furthermore, the treatment of the
individual dispersers as part of the experimental population and the
corresponding reduction in their status from endangered to threatened
violated the ESA. 395 The 10th Circuit correctly reversed the district
court on each of these points and upheld the FWS decision.396 The
10th Circuit's decision was consistent with the text, intent, and
purposes of the statute and reflected the current policy preferences.
The experimental population was "wholly separate
geographically" from the natural population. 397 Individual dispersers
did not constitute a population. The FWS's definition of population
focused on breeding pairs, which insures reproduction and
sustainability. Section 100) refers to populations, not individuals.
398
The FWS definition, which had been upheld by the 9th Circuit in
McKittrick v. US, was consistent with expert opinion and realized the
statutory purpose to conserve endangered species.
The experimental population was released outside the
"current range" of the natural population. 399 The definition of range
assumes a breeding population and does not include individual
dispersers. This is consistent with expert opinion. The district court's
finding that anywhere an individual appears constitutes the current
range of the species was too broad.
Individual dispersers in the experimental population area can
be treated as part of the experimental population. The Secretary can
establish the experimental population based on its location. The
status of individuals is determined by their location and changes as
the individual moves. Interior can provide different degrees of
protection to distinct population segments of the same species.
Although the individual dispersers are not a distinct population
segment, they can receive similar treatment. Section 10(j) granted
broad discretionary authority to the Secretary regarding experimental
populations. Congress assumed that some individuals would loose
their protected status. Treating individual dispersers as part of the
experimental population helped to realize the conservation goals of
the statute and avoid law enforcement problems.
Congress was aware of the FWS wolf reintroduction and did






398See generally text, supra p. 12.
9see id.
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it demonstrated that the FWS statutory interpretation was consistent
with the "presumed" legislative intent. The Supreme Court has held
that legislative inaction indicates acquiescence with the
administrative decision.400 Congress supported wolf reintroduction
by continuing to appropriate funds for the project. Congress rejected
several proposals that would have amended section 10(j) and
jeopardized wolf reintroduction. Furthermore, the failure of
Congress to overturn the FWS's decision when viewed from the
perspective of positive political theory lends further support to
congressional acquiescence.
Legislative inaction is a significant factor regarding statutory
interpretation. 401 From an originalist perspective, legislative inaction
can demonstrate vertical coherence, the consistency of the
interpretation through time.40 2 For dynamic statutory interpretation,
legislative inaction can show horizontal coherence, the congruence of
the interpretation with contemporary values. The 10th Circuit's
decision demonstrated both vertical and horizontal coherence and
was consistent with the text, intent, and purposes of 
section 100).401
McKittrick. was also harmonious with current congressional
policy.4°4 In the absence of future congressional action, the 10th
Circuit decision in WYFB and the 9th Circuit decision in McKittrick
will become the "building block" decisions, which define the scope of
section 10(j).
If the traditional tools do not answer the interpretative
question, Chevron instructs the court to defer to the agency's legal
interpretation if it is reasonable. 40 5  By definition, a reasonable
decision must be consistent with text, intent, and purposes of the
statute.406 The FWS decision was reasonable. Congress delegated
broad authority to the Secretary to implement section 100).407 The
determinations regarding population, current range, and status of
individual dispersers were issues of scientific complexity, which
Congress delegated to the agency. 40 8 The FWS interpretation of the
statute successfully realized the statutory purpose to reintroduce the
gray wolf back to its historic range.
The final issue in the litigation involved the FWS compliance
400Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 568 (1984); See also, Bob Jones
University v. US., 451 U.S. 574, 600 (1983).401 
See supra p. 15.
40 2
1d.
403See generally, Wyoming, 199 F.3d 1224 (10"h Cir. 2000).
404See generally, United States v. MeKittrick, 142 F.3d, at 1174-75.
405 
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with the NEPA. Both the district and 10th Circuit properly
determined that EIS complied with the NEPA.40 9 The courts found
the FWS determinations were supported by the record and the agency
made no clear error of judgment. 410  The FWS "considered the
relevant factors" and "articulated a rational connection between the
facts found and the decision made."
411
The 10th Circuit's decision was important for all
reintroduction efforts.4 12  Wolf reintroduction has been very
successful. 413  Wolf numbers have increased in the northern
Rockies. 414  Northwest Montana supports approximately sixty-three
wolves in five packs. The central Idaho reintroduction area contains
at least 141 wolves, including ten breeding packs.4 15 In Yellowstone,
there are 118 wolves, including eight reproducing packs. 416
The wolves are very beneficial to the ecosystem 17 Wolf
depredation provides for the removal of diseased animals, the culling
of deformed or genetically inferior animals before reproduction, the
acceleration of reproductive rates among prey through higher twining
and fertility, and the maintenance of prey population at levels that can
be supported by the habitat.418  Reduction in the bison and elk, the
principal prey of the wolves, has allowed the willow and aspen trees
to regain their place in the area, which has been overgrazed . 9
Wolf reintroduction has improved biodiversity in the
4°See supra p.13.4 10
1d.
4 1]Babbitt, 987 F.Supp., at 1369.
412One commentator observed that:
Since the passage of the ESA, 912 United States plants and animals have been listed
as threatened or endangered. Of these, only six have fully recovered, while seven
others became extinct. In addition, fourteen more species are feared to be extinct,
and 304 of the rest currently have no plan in place to save them. Craig E. Enochs,
Gone Today, Here Tomorrow, 4 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 91, 92
(1997); See also, Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of
Being Wild, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).413Wolok, 26 ELR, at 10,027-30; Nicole R. Matthews, Who is the Predator and
Who Is the Prey? 6 ENVTL. L. 183 (1999); Ed Bangs, Comments to the Third Annual





416FWS, Gray Wolves Rebound: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Proposes to
Reclassify, Delist the Wolves in Much of the U.S., News Release, at
http://midwest.fws.gov/wolfproposal (last visited July 11, 2000).4 17
1d.
418Todd, supra note 67, at 478.
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yellowstone Wolves in Diversity, N.Y.TIMES, January 4, 1998, §4, at 10;
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January 27, 2001).
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northern Rockies. The wolves kill an elk every few days.
420  The
carcasses provide food for other animals. The coyotes, which live on
the outskirts of wolves territory, have prospered from wolf kills. The
grizzly bears also benefit from wolf kills, which provides
nourishment before hibernation. The wolves also kill coyotes, and
this has resulted in an increase in rodents, which has benefited other
predators, such as foxes, owls, hawks, eagles, badgers and pine
materns. 421 As the Nez Perce appropriately observed, "For a long
while, the wolves have been missing. Now they're back. The circle
of life is stronger.
4 22
The wolves have not decimated the livestock industry.
423
The Defenders of the Wildlife (DOW) maintain a $100,000 Wolf
Compensation Trust, which compensates ranchers at fair market
value for losses due to wolves and at half market value for other
losses when the wolves are the likely culprits.
424  The Trust,
established in 1987, covers losses in Arizona and New Mexico,
Yellowstone, central Idaho, and expanding areas where reintroduced
wolves are beginning to disperse.425 As of December 2000, the total
payments from the Trust were $155,433. In the greater Yellowstone
ecosystem, 124 sheep, twenty-six cattle, and nine others have been
killed by wolves, requiring $46,349 in compensation. In central
Idaho, 192 sheep, sixty-three cattle, and two others have been killed,
requiring $56,945 in compensation. In northwest Montana, sixty-nine
sheep, eighty-four cattle, and one other have been killed, requiring
$46,122 in compensation.426 By comparison, 11,200 sheep were lost
to coyotes, 500 to domestic dogs, 11,600 to weather or disease in
Idaho in 1998.427 The livestock industry in Montana annually loses
142,000 sheep and 86,000 cattle that are valued at $45 million.
428





422William J. Snape, Big Wind for Wolves, DEFENDERS, Spring 2000, at 7.
423Ironically, the district court warned the industry, "Be careful what you wish for,
you might just get it." The natural population of wolves would eventually move into northern
Rockies and receive the highest ESA protection. 987 F. Supp., at 1376. See also, U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Resources. The Reintroduction of the Gray Wolf Into
Yellowstone National Park and Central Idaho (testimony of Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of
Interior) (Jan. 26, 1995). Moore, 12 Thomas Cooley L. Rev., at 655, 678.4 24
Defenders of Wildlife, Wolf Compensation Trust, at
www.defenders.org/wolfcomp.html ( last visited January 27, 2001). The fund also provides
compensation for losses caused by the Mexican wolf. In the southwest, eight cattle, three others
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429area, which has benefited local economies. Since the wolves were
reintroduced to Yellowstone in 1995, the region has experienced a
$10 million increase in economic activity. 430 The FWS estimates that
the wolves will continue to attract more visitors, eventually
generating $23 million per year to Yellowstone.43'
The wolf reintroduction program has been "truly an
endangered species success story." This has prompted the FWS to
formally propose the reclassification of the gray wolf from
endangered to threatened in some parts of the country and the
removal the species from the Endangered Species list in other
areas.432 Secretary Babbitt stated, "[w]olves are a living symbol of
the regard Americans have for things wild. We as a people have
made the choice to do the right thing and bring these animals back
from the brink of extinction. We have weighed the cost of saving an
irreplaceable part of our world and found it to be worth our effort."
433
429 Defenders of the Wildlife, Restoring Wolves, at www.defenders.org/wildlife/wolf




432FWS News Release (July I1, 2000). Many environmentalist feel this move is
premature. Roger Sehliekeisen, president of the DOW, stated, "Although the FWS has made
progress in recovering the wolf, there is still a huge gap between what should responsibly be
done for the wolf and what the FWS proposes. The proposal ignores the potential for wolves to
recolonize remaining suitable habitat such as the southern Rockies and northern California and
their need for protection while doing so." DOW News Release (September 15, 2000)
(www.defenders.org/releases).433
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